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Abstract
This paper analyzes the problem of aggregating individual judgments over two in-
terconnected issues. Voters share a common preference which is state-dependent,
but they hold private information about what the state might be. I assume stra-
tegic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting and I want to determine voting
rules which induce an efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies,
hence lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private inform-
ation. Interconnectedness may lead to private information that is inconsistent
with the state, which leads to the impossibility of efficient information aggrega-
tion. Once I introduce the possibility of abstention, the negative conclusion no
longer prevails and there is always a voting rule which aggregates information
efficiently. I obtain a similar positive result when I rule out the possibility of
inconsistent private information. I analyze the situations in which such rules
exist whenever necessary, as well as the nature of these rules.
Keywords: judgment aggregation, efficient information aggregation, strategic
voting, private information
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1 Introduction
How should a group of individuals form a collective ‘yes’ or ‘no’ judgment on several
issues given judgments of the group members? Judgment aggregation theory focuses
on this question which has wide applications in many collective decision-making bod-
ies, ranging from expert panels to juries, legislative committees to multi-member
courts and so on. A typical example is the problem of the jury in a court trial, where
the jury needs to form a collective ‘yes’ or ‘no’ judgment on whether the defendant
has broken the contract and whether the contract is legally valid. The collective
judgments on these issues typically determine a third issue, whether the defendant
should be convicted. The issues for which a vote is taken can in principle be ‘mutually
interconnected’ in such problems, i.e., a judgment made on one issue may restrict the
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judgment on the other. For instance, an expert panel might need to form ‘yes’ or ‘no’
judgments on the two issues of whether the CO2 emissions are above a given threshold
and whether there will be a critical temperature change, where a ‘yes’ judgment on
the first issue requires a ‘yes’ judgment on the second issue; the United Nations se-
curity council might need to form judgments on whether a country will suffer a civil
war, and whether it will suffer a severe socio-economic crisis, where the former implies
the latter; the EU commission might need to form judgments on whether a candidate
country has implemented benchmark political criteria and whether the country’s eco-
nomy is unstable, where the negation of the former implies the latter and so on. As in
the court trial example where the jury convicts the defendant or not, groups may take
an action depending on the collective judgments, such as a large scale intervention
in the UN example or providing additional funds to the candidate country in the EU
commission example.
This paper considers a judgment aggregation problem where there are two intercon-
nected issues in the agenda of a committee. I assume that there is an objective truth
to be found, called the state (of the world). Individuals share a common preference
for state-matching (true) collective judgments, but hold possibly conflicting private
information about the state. I assume strategic voting, that is, rational behavior in
the sense of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game and I want to an-
swer the following question: which voting rules (if any) lead to collective judgments
which are efficient given all voters’ private information? Such voting rules would
give incentives for truthful voting behavior in equilibrium, which cannot be taken
for granted even when voters have no conflict of interest. That’s because a voter
can change the collective judgment on an issue only when she is pivotal, and being
pivotal may eliminate the strategic incentive to vote truthfully. This observation is
due to Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), where they study binary collective choice
problems (which can be seen as a judgment aggregation problem with only one issue)
with common interests and private information, and it gives rise to the analysis and
design of voting rules which lead to truthful behavior of individuals as well as correct
decisions.
The information aggregation analysis has been applied to multiple issues previously
in Ahn and Oliveros (2013), Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters (2014) and De Clippel and
Eliaz (2015). While the first and the last papers compare the asymptotic efficiency
of different mechanisms, the second studies the problem of designing a voting rule, as
in the present paper. These papers do not consider logical interconnections between
issues and they assume independent issues.1 Given that interconnections are an im-
portant aspect of judgment aggregation theory and they are important in practice,
this paper studies efficient information aggregation for agendas with two interconnec-
ted issues, where the issues present a particular logical structure and judgments made
1Note that analysing multiple issues in the absence of interconnections does not reduce to analysing
each issue separately since preferences are non-separable and they establish links between issues. For
instance, in the above mentioned papers, a voter’s utility is not necessarily monotonic in the number
of accepted issues. On the other hand, interconnections are what make judgment aggregation non-
trivial in the absence of strategic behavior.
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on issues logically constrain each other. In the absence of private information and the
strategic incentives that follow, interconnectedness may lead to logically inconsistent
collective judgments (as reviewed in the next section) due to procedural requirements
on the voting rule. In the present paper’s framework, interconnectedness may lead
to private information that is inconsistent with the state which leads to the (partial)
impossibility of efficient information aggregation. While with multiple independent
issues and with a single issue, a voting rule which induces an efficient Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in truthful strategies always exists (see Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996
and Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters, 2014), I find that with two interconnected issues
such voting rule exists only under a strong condition relating the model parameters
and preferences. I derive a similar result for a variety of definitions of truthful (or,
informative) voting in Section 3. These results are mainly driven by the difficulty of
truthfully revealing the private information that is inconsistent with the state. The
possibility of inconsistent private information naturally leads to a mismatch between
the state space and the type space, which eventually drives the impossibility results.2
Once this mismatch is ruled out by assuming that private information is distributed
jointly rather than independently for issues, it is possible to obtain a general existence
result, as I show in Section 5.
Can inconsistent private information always be avoided in reality? If the evidence for
each issue comes from a different expert (or data set, witness, experiment, etc.) and
experts act independently, one may end up with overall inconsistent information when
issues are interconnected. The problem becomes increasingly relevant the larger the
set of available information sources is, which is a reality of our times. To overcome the
impossibility in the case of inconsistent private information, I introduce abstention
as a possible voting behavior in Section 4. Indeed, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)
show that less informed (or uninformed) voters have an incentive to delegate their
vote via abstention to more informed voters in a model where (a fraction of) voters
hold state-dependent common preferences and private information. In the present
paper’s framework, a voter with inconsistent private information knows that she is
‘ill-informed’. As preferences are common, this voter might prefer to abstain in the
hope that voters without inconsistent information will determine the decision. I con-
sider the particular voting behavior (which I call informative voting with abstention)
where each voter with the inconsistent type abstains while others truthfully report.
I show that one can always find a voting rule which guarantees an efficient Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in such voting behavior. Apart from the general existence claim,
I also focus on the specific kinds of common preferences. Under simple preferences
where state-matching decisions are preferred to non-matching ones, it will turn out
that one should use a ‘quota rule with exception’, which behaves like a quota rule3
2In that sense, Section 3 of this paper contributes to the literature which studies the effects of
relative richness of signal and state spaces to information aggregation; see, e.g., Schmitz and Tro¨ger
(2012), Barelli, Bhattacharya and Siga (2018) and Bozbay and Peters (2018). In each of these papers,
an efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies does not generally exist, though each
considers a very different model than the current paper’s.
3A quota rule decides on each issue according to whether the number of ‘yes’ judgments on the
issue exceeds a particular quota.
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except when neither issue reaches the acceptance quota. In that case, the rule decides
according to an ‘exception rule’. Next, I focus on consequentialist preferences, which
assume that group decision on issues leads to group action (such as convicting or
acquitting a defendant or a large scale UN intervention) and a voter prefers correct
group action to incorrect one regardless of the correctness of the underlying decision.
Under consequentialist preferences, although a voting rule which efficiently aggreg-
ates information always exists, it is a quota rule with exception only under certain
restrictions on the parameters of the model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I introduce the model. Section 3 ad-
dresses the key question of whether a voting rule that leads to efficient decisions as
well as truthful voting behavior in equilibrium exists. The answer is no in most cases,
and under a variety of possible definitions of truthful voting. In Sections 4 and 5, I
propose the possibility of abstaining and jointly distributed private information re-
spectively, as possible escapes from the impossibility. Sections 3, 4 and 5 all analyze
the particular kinds of truth-tracking preferences (simple and consequentialist) as
well as the general case. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
The judgment aggregation literature contains several possibility and impossibility
results generalizing the observation that majority judgments can be logically incon-
sistent, a phenomenon which is referred to as the discursive dilemma. For an intro-
ductory overview of judgment aggregation theory, see papers in the Symposium on
Judgment Aggregation in Journal of Economic Theory (C. List and B. Polak eds.,
2010). I now selectively review the papers in judgment aggregation literature which
consider strategic voting or take a truth-tracking approach in the sense that there is
a true state of the world and voters share a common preference for reaching this true
state in their collective decision. Dietrich and List (2007a) analyze strategic voting
in judgment aggregation but in a setting where voters have private values instead
of private information. See also related work by Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2007),
Dokow and Falik (2012) and Dietrich (2016). Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), List
(2005) and Pivato (2013) are few contributions taking the truth-tracking approach,
where they apply the Condorcet Jury Theorem to judgment aggregation without
considering private information and strategic incentives. See List and Pettit (2011)
for a philosophical analysis of the truth-tracking approach. The analysis of strategic
voting under common preferences and private information is well-established in the
literature on binary collective choice problems, which is about voting on one issue and
started with the seminal works by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997). In this framework, voters share common preferences for reaching
true decisions (with some degree of heterogeneity in preferences in the latter work)
but they hold private information about what the truth might be. They show that
it need not be rational for all voters to vote truthfully and taking this into account,
they analyze asymptotic efficiency. Their observation gives rise to their analysis of
voting rules which make truthful voting occur in equilibrium.
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The introduction of multiple issues to strategic voting and information aggregation
problems is by Ahn and Oliveros (2012, 2013). While the first paper considers private
values, the second assumes common values and is more relevant. In this paper, they
compare the asymptotic efficiency of two different mechanisms: a joint trial where
both issues are resolved by a majority vote among the group, and a severed trial
where each issue is decided by a majority vote among a subgroup. They show that
neither of these procedures is generally more efficient than the other one if the group
is large enough. Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters (2014) aim to design voting rules that
efficiently use all private information and lead to truthful voting. They find that in
most cases, a quota rule, which decides each issue according to whether the proportion
of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular threshold, can or should be used to guarantee
efficient information aggregation. The present paper is an extension of their work to
interconnected issues, and it turns out that when it comes to interconnected issues,
there exists no quota rule which makes truthful voting efficient. De Clippel and
Eliaz (2015) consider a setting where a group’s optimal action (such as convicting or
acquitting the defendant) depends on whether some premises are judged to be true
by the group. They compare premise-based voting with conclusion-based voting.
Under the former, a vote is taken on each issue, and the group action (conclusion)
is determined by the outcome of voting which is decided by a super-majority rule.
Under the latter, the group votes directly on which action to take, without forming a
group decision on the issues. They show that premise-based voting is more efficient
than conclusion-based voting, but that the difference vanishes asymptotically as the
group size increases. All three aforementioned papers consider independent issues but
the analysis is non-trivial given that preferences are non-separable and they establish
links between issues.4 In the case of interconnected issues, there is an extra degree of
non-separability, which follows from the fact that issues present a particular logical
structure. This additional non-separability changes the structure of the voting rules
that lead to efficient information aggregation.
2 The Model
2.1 The judgment aggregation problem
I consider a group of voters, labeled i = 1, ..., n, where n ≥ 2. This group needs a col-
lective judgment on whether some proposition p or its negation p¯ is true, and whether
some other proposition q or its negation q¯ is true. While doing so, voters know that
4For instance, the model in Ahn and Oliveros (2013) allows for a setting where accepting only a
particular issue among two issues is the best (common) outcome while accepting both issues may be
worse than rejecting both. Similarly, in Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters (2014) and De Clippel and Eliaz
(2015), the optimal group action that is taken as a result of the vote may follow a standard which
is not necessarily monotonic in the number of accepted issues. For instance, given the state of the
world voters may be indifferent between accepting both issues and rejecting both issues while they
prefer both of these outcomes to accepting only one issue (because these are the outcomes that lead
to the correct group action).
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the combination {p¯, q¯} is not possible. Hence, the interconnection between the two
propositions is encoded by ‘p¯ → q’. Any other type of interconnection between two
issues (except bi-implication) is equivalent to this one up to isomorphism, so up to
interchanging the roles of each proposition by its negation. Hence, studying this inter-
connection allows me to cover all possible interconnections between two propositions
(except bi-implication, which is a trivial case). The three possible judgment sets are
{p, q}, {p, q¯}, {p¯, q}, abbreviated by pq, pq¯ and p¯q, respectively. Similarly, {p¯, q¯} is
abbreviated by p¯q¯. Each voter votes for a judgment set in J = {pq, pq¯, p¯q}. A col-
lective decision in J is taken using a voting rule, defined as a function f : J n → J ,
which maps each voting profile v = (v1, ..., vn) to a decision d = f(v).
2.2 Truth-tracking preferences
There is one ‘correct’ judgment set in J , which I call the state (of the world) and
denote by s. The state is unobservable by voters. Voters have identical preferences,
represented by a common utility function u : J × J → R which maps any decision-
state pair (d, s) to its utility u(d, s). Since voters are truth-trackers, i.e., they want
to reach the true state of the world, one should expect the utility to be high if the
decision is correct.5 However, multiplicity of issues and the structure of the problem
allow for different specifications. I mainly consider two kinds of preferences, namely,
simple and consequentialist preferences. Under simple preferences, voters want to
find out the state-matching decision. The utility function is given by
u(d, s) =
{
1 if d = s (correct decision)
0 if d 6= s (incorrect decision). (1)
To define consequentialist preferences, I assume that there are two possible con-
sequences of voting, which represent group action. A consequence function Co maps
the set J to a two-element set of possible consequences. Consider the example of the
EU Commission, having to decide whether to supply additional funds to a candidate
country. This depends on the collective judgments on two issues: p: ‘the country
has implemented its benchmark political criteria’ and q: ‘the country’s economy is
unstable’, where the negation of the former implies the latter, p¯ → q. If both issues
are judged to be true, the consequence is to supply the funds, so Co(pq) =‘supply’.
If only one of the issues is judged to be true, then the commission does not see the
country as a good candidate for additional funds since they are either unnecessary or
not deserved; so Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q) =‘no supply’.6 Note that this consequence function
with the property
Co(pq) 6= Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q) (2)
5Formally, under truth-tracking preferences, if u(d, s) = u¯ when d = s, then u(d′, s) ≤ u¯ for all
d′ ∈ J \ {d} with strict inequality for at least one decision.
6The two possible consequences ‘supply’ and ‘no supply’ may also be represented by a conclusion
proposition c and its negation c¯ respectively, as commonly done in judgment aggregation literature.
Then, the consequence would be encoded in the biconditional c↔ (p ∧ q).
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is the only interesting consequence function up to isomorphism. That’s because con-
sequence functions which lead all decisions to the same consequence are degenerate
and uninteresting. Moreover, if the consequence function depends only on the decision
between p and p¯ (as in, Co(pq) = Co(pq¯) 6= Co(p¯q)), or only on the decision between
q and q¯ (as in, Co(pq) = Co(p¯q) 6= Co(pq¯)), then the problem reduces to making
a judgment on a single proposition-negation pair which has already been studied in
the literature on binary collective choice with common interests. So, studying the
consequence function with the property (2) covers non-degenerate consequentialist
preferences exhaustively. Throughout the paper, when considering consequentalist
preferences, I will assume that the consequence function Co satisfies (2). Hence, I
define the consequentialist utility function as
u(d, s) =
{
1 if Co(d) = Co(s) (correct consequence)
0 if Co(d) 6= Co(s) (incorrect consequence), (3)
where Co is any consequence function satisfying (2).
Simple preferences may describe an environment where judgments on issues do not
necessarily lead to a consequence or action, or where voters want to reach the right
action through correct reasons. Note that incorrect decisions may lead to correct
consequences. On the other hand, under consequentialist preferences, voters want to
reach the correct consequence no matter whether the underlying premises are correct
or not.
2.3 Private information and strategies
Each voter has a type, which is an element of T = {pq, pq¯, p¯q, p¯q¯} and is denoted by t
generically. A voter’s type represents evidence about whether p is true and whether q
is true. For instance, the type t = pq¯ represents evidence for p and for q¯, and the type
t = p¯q¯ represents evidence for p¯ and for q¯, which overall is conflicting information7
since p¯q¯ 6∈ J . I write t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈ T n for a profile of voters’ types.
Nature draws a state-types combination (s, t) in J × T n according to a probability
measure denoted Pr. The prior probability of state s ∈ J is denoted
pis = Pr(s)
and is assumed to be in the interval (0, 1). If a proposition r ∈ {p, p¯, q, q¯} represents
(part of) voter i’s type rather than (part of) the true state, I often write ri for r. I
write Pr(pi|p) for the probability that voter i has evidence for p given that p is true.
The probability of getting evidence for r given that r is true is denoted
ar = Pr(ri|r)
and by assumption belongs to (1/2, 1) and does not depend on the voter i.
7Conflicting information occurs with positive probability in this model, given the standard inde-
pendence assumptions on the distribution of types.
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I assume voters’ types are independent given the state. Moreover, given the truth
about p (i.e., either p or p¯), a voter’s evidence about p (i.e., either pi or p¯i) is inde-
pendent of the truth and the evidence about q; and similarly, given the truth about
q, a voter’s evidence about q is independent of the truth and the evidence about p.
The joint distribution of the state and the types is then given by
Pr(s, t) = Pr(s)×
n∏
i=1
Pr(ti|s).
Each voter votes for a judgment in J based on her type. A (voting) strategy is a
function σ : T → J , mapping each type t ∈ T to the type’s vote v = σ(t). I write
σ = (σ1, ...., σn) for a profile of voters’ strategies. I say that a strategy profile σ is
efficient if for every type profile t, the resulting decision d = f(σ1(t1), ..., σn(tn)) is
efficient, i.e., has maximal expected utility conditional on full information t. This
means the collective decision is no worse than a decision of a social planner who has
full information.
Throughout the paper, I refer to ‘n, pis for s ∈ J , ar for r ∈ {p, p¯, q, q¯}’ as model
parameters, or simply, parameters. To avoid distraction by special cases, I make two
assumptions on the combinations of these parameters:
Non-degeneracy: I exclude the combinations of the parameters where some decision
in J is not efficient for any type profile.
No efficiency ties: I exclude efficiency ties, i.e., those special parameter combinations
such that some type profile t leads to different efficient decisions except in the case
that, for a given state, these decisions have the same utility independently of the
model parameters and realization of types. Under simple preferences, I exclude those
combinations of the parameters such that some type profile leads to multiple effi-
cient decisions. Under consequentialist preferences, this amounts to excluding those
combinations of the parameters such that some type profile leads to multiple efficient
decisions with different consequences.
By the former assumption, I rule out those degenerate situations where no individual
would ever prefer a certain state irrespective of the profile of signals. By the lat-
ter assumption, a voter is never indifferent between two decisions except in the case
that these decisions lead to the same utility regardless of the combination of model
parameters, such as decisions with the same consequence under consequentialist pref-
erences. These assumptions or their analogues are standard in the literature on binary
collective choice with common interests and shared by several works.
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3 A general (im)possibility
3.1 Setting the stage
My aim, besides efficiency, is to obtain simple-minded, truthful voting behavior in
equilibrium. This type of voting behavior has been represented by the notions of
informative strategy or sincere strategy in the strategic voting and binary collective
choice literature. Informative strategy generally means revealing the type in the vote,
without further calculations. Sincere strategy, on the other hand, is usually defined
as voting as if one’s own vote alone determined the outcome. Hence, a voter adopting
the sincere strategy votes for the decision that maximizes her expected payoff given
her type alone. I mean informative voting by truthful behavior in this paper. My
objective is to design the voting rule in such a way that the rule will lead to efficient
decisions on the basis of informative votes. Reaching efficient decisions is the most
important goal here, since an efficient decision maximizes the expected utility of
every voter as preferences are common. Ideally, this rule should also lead to simple-
minded and truthful voting behavior; in other words, informative voting. Apart from
not requiring much sophistication from a voter, what makes informative strategy
desirable? In the model presented here (and in binary collective choice literature as
well as its multi-issue extension), a social planner who has all the available information
knows exactly which decision is the most likely to be true. In the absence of such
prior knowledge, informative strategy is what reveals the valuable information about
the true state. In a setting where votes reveal nothing about the private information,
a social planner (or a mechanism designer) who cannot observe the types might be
clueless about the efficient decision. Thus, it is desirable for the designer that voters
are incentivized to vote informatively. So, as a second goal, informative voting should
constitute an equilibrium, i.e., the profile of informative strategies must be a Nash
equilibrium of the corresponding Bayesian game. My objective is reduced to finding
out when – under which voting rule – informative voting is efficient as efficiency is the
best outcome for every voter. This is an implication of a well-known result, Theorem
1 by McLennan (1998), which states that for any voting rule, an efficient strategy
profile is an equilibrium. Hence, as long as I have a rule that renders informative
voting efficient, both goals are reached: voters are incentivized to vote informatively
and the voting rule aggregates these votes into the efficient decision. When I say a
voting rule makes informative voting efficient, I mean, for every realization of types,
the voting rule leads to the expected utility maximizing decision on the basis of
informative votes. This voting rule should be designed so as to help finding the
‘correct’ alternative by making optimal use of all the private information scattered
across the voters.
The challenge here is to define an informative strategy. As one type – p¯q¯ – cannot be
revealed directly in the vote, I cannot use the standard definition where type matches
the vote. Consequently, I consider three natural extensions of the standard notion
of informative strategy. It turns out that whichever definition I adhere to, it is not
possible to find a voting rule which works under any combination of the parameters of
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the model. Only under very strong conditions – and depending on the specific utility
function – one might have a voting rule which leads to efficient outcomes on the
basis of informative votes. These (partial) impossibilities are results of the inability
to fully reveal private information in the votes, due to the possibility of conflicting
information. In Section 4, I introduce the possibility of abstention which solves the
former issue and makes efficient information aggregation a possibility. In Section 5,
I rule out conflicting information by assuming jointly distributed types (instead of
independently for each issue) at the cost of some symmetry assumptions. Once again,
this leads to efficient information aggregation by a voting rule.
3.2 General preferences
To start with, I define an informative strategy. Generally, I call a strategy σ of a
voter informative if σ(t) = t for all t ∈ T \ {p¯q¯}. I will later add further restric-
tions on an informative strategy and obtain different types of informative strategies
depending on how a strategy σ maps the type p¯q¯. Before, I state the following the-
orem which shows that the current definition is too unrestrictive, and there is no rule
which renders informative voting efficient without restrictions on the combination of
parameters.
Theorem 1 Consider an arbitrary common utility function u : J × J → R that is
truth-tracking. There is no voting rule for which informative voting is efficient.
Although the proof of this theorem is written for two issues only, the message of the
theorem can be extended to the case of arbitrary number of issues some of which
are interconnected. Consider a type that is inconsistent with any true state, and a
type profile where every voter has this inconsistent type. According to the definition
above, this type profile might lead to any voting profile under informative voting. So,
the same decision(s) must be efficient for every possible type profile for efficient in-
formation aggregation to have a chance, and this is an uninteresting (and degenerate)
case where private information plays no role whatsoever.
The theorem shows that the current definition of informative voting is not restrictive
enough. Indeed, the type p¯q¯ still provides useful information about the true state of
the world since the probability of getting correct information for each proposition is
greater than 1/2. So, it is natural that type p¯q¯ is not totally ignored. I now define
three types of informative strategies which differ from each other in their approach to
t = p¯q¯. All three share that when the type is different than p¯q¯, it is directly revealed
in the vote as they are informative in the general sense defined above.
I say that an informative strategy σ is of class 1 if σ(p¯q¯) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}. Here, inform-
ativeness is open to behavior: one can choose between pq¯ and p¯q under conflicting
evidence. A similar definition which is not open to behavior is the following. An
informative strategy σ is of class 2 if σ(p¯q¯) = argmaxs∈{pq¯,p¯q} pis. So, besides fol-
lowing the evidence as much as possible, an informative voter of class 2 also takes
into account the prior probabilities and votes for pq¯ or p¯q depending on which one
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has a higher prior probability. Finally, an informative strategy σ is of class 3 if
σ(p¯q¯) = argmaxd∈J E(u(d, S)|t = p¯q¯), where S denotes the random variable generat-
ing the state. Here, voters with conflicting types vote for the judgment set with the
highest expected utility given the conflicting type. So, when the type is conflicting,
one makes use of the private information by voting sincerely.
Note that in the case pipq¯ = pip¯q, the informative strategy of class 2 is not decisive.
Similarly, if there are multiple decisions that maximize E(u(d, S)|t = p¯q¯), the inform-
ative strategy of class 3 is not decisive. For the purpose of this section, I omit these
cases, or assume that in such situations there is an agreement to follow a particular
decision (for instance, if pipq¯ = pip¯q, for every voter σ(p¯q¯) = pq¯). This is because the
case where the informative strategy is open to behavior is already covered by the
analysis of the informative strategy of class 1.8 What I aim by studying the other
two kinds of strategies is to see whether restrictions on the votes of conflicting types
help efficient information aggregation. The results, which I present below, show that
informative voting of a certain class is efficient only under a very strong condition
over the model parameters. So, even when informative strategy is fully restrictive
and not open to behavior, it is not possible to obtain a general possibility. Before
stating these conditions and the characterization result for each class of informative
voting, I state these conditions, which I call joint efficiency 1 and joint efficiency 2.
For the definition of the former, the following is needed: for all M ⊆ {1, ..., n}, let
T n(M) = {t ∈ T n : {i : ti = pq} = M}.
Joint efficiency 1: For any M ⊆ {1, ..., n}, there exists a decision d ∈ J that is
efficient for all t ∈ T n(M).
I denote by σinf the unique informative strategy given class 2 or given class 3. The
corresponding informative strategy profile, where each voter votes informatively ac-
cording to informative strategy of a certain class is denoted by σinf = (σinf1 , ..., σ
inf
n ).
For any vector w ∈ J n, I define T n(w) = {t ∈ T n : σinf (t) = w}.
Joint efficiency 2: For any w ∈ J n, there exists a decision d ∈ J that is efficient for
all t ∈ T n(w).
Theorem 2 Consider an arbitrary common utility function u : J × J → R that is
truth-tracking. Assume informative voting of class 1 (class 2) [class 3]. There exists
a voting rule for which informative voting is efficient if and only if joint efficiency 1
(joint efficiency 2) [joint efficiency 2] holds.
8As the first class of informative strategy is open to behavior, given a type profile t, an informative
strategy profile is not necessarily uniquely defined and the same type profile may produce different
voting profiles. Informative voting of class 1 being efficient means that for any given type profile
t, every profile of corresponding informative strategies is efficient. A voting rule which makes some
strategy profiles efficient and some not is not interesting since a designer never knows how these
voters will vote. Under the class 2 or class 3 informative strategy, a type profile t is mapped to a
unique voting profile.
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These conditions are clearly strong. Joint efficiency 1 requires that for all type profiles
where the same group of voters have type pq, there must be a common efficient
decision. Joint efficiency 2 requires that for all type profiles that produce the same
voting profile, there must be a common efficient decision.9 Suppose the decision that
maximizes E(u(d, S)|t = p¯q¯) is p¯q without loss of generality. Joint efficiency 2 imposes
that the type profile t = (p¯q, . . . , p¯q) and t′ = (p¯q¯, . . . , p¯q¯) should have a common
efficient decision. While the former has full evidence for q being true, the latter has the
opposite, hence, full evidence for q being not true. Yet, only when there is a common
efficient decision for both, there is a chance for efficient information aggregation.
The condition is strong, though implications may vary depending on the particular
kind of truth-tracking preferences we consider. For instance, under a consequentialist
framework, q and q¯ may have similar effects on the outcome, hence, on the utility. So,
I now narrow the focus to the specific kind of preferences to see further implications
of these conditions. I study simple and consequentialist preferences in turn in the
following subsections, so that I can say more about the nature of voting rules making
informative voting efficient whenever the relevant condition is satisfied.
3.3 Simple preferences
I start by addressing simple preferences, defined by (1), where correct decisions are
preferred to incorrect ones. By focusing on simple preferences, can we say more
than the (partial) existential claim of Theorem 2? The actual answer depends on
which class of informative voting we focus on. For instance, it turns out that joint
efficiency 1 never holds under simple preferences. Consequently, I have the following
impossibility result.
Theorem 3 Under simple preferences, there exists no voting rule for which inform-
ative voting of class 1 is efficient.
It is possible that joint efficiency 2 holds under simple preferences, no matter if we
focus on informative strategy of class 2 or 3. Here is an example:
Example 1 Consider the following combination of parameters: n = 3, ap = 0.55,
aq = 0.52, ap¯ = 0.55, aq¯ = 0.6, pipq = 0.3, pipq¯ = 0.5 and pip¯q = 0.2. If we focus on
the informative voting of class 2, σinf (p¯q¯) = pq¯ as pipq¯ > pip¯q. If we instead focus on
the informative voting of class 3, once again σinf (p¯q¯) = pq¯ since d = pq¯ maximizes
E(u(d, S)|p¯q¯). (The expressions that lead to these calculations are in Appendix.)
So, every conclusion of this example applies to either of the two definitions. Joint
efficiency 2 requires that the efficient decision is the same for all type profiles which
lead to the same informative voting profile. The table below groups all such type
profiles (up to permuting the order of the types). For each type profile in a group of
9It is clear that the interpretations of these two conditions are equivalent. One can alternatively
define a unique condition which implies joint efficiency 1 under informative voting of class 1 and
joint efficiency 2 under the other two classes. However, two separate conditions are preferable for
simplicity of notation and for direct understanding of the conditions.
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type profiles leading to the same voting profile under informative voting, there is a
common efficient decision.
Table 1: Under simple preferences, joint efficiency 2 for informative voting of type 2 holds for the
following parameter combinations: n = 3, ap = 0.55, aq = 0.52, ap¯ = 0.55, aq¯ = 0.6, pipq = 0.3,
pipq¯ = 0.5 and pip¯q = 0.2
Group Type profile t
Voting profile
v = σinf (t)
Efficient decision for
t
1
(pq¯, pq¯, pq¯)
(p¯q¯, p¯q¯, p¯q¯)
(pq¯, pq¯, p¯q¯)
(pq¯, p¯q¯, p¯q¯)
(pq¯, pq¯, pq¯) d∗ = pq¯
2
(pq, pq¯, pq¯)
(pq, p¯q¯, p¯q¯)
(pq, pq¯, p¯q¯)
(pq, pq¯, pq¯) d∗ = pq¯
3
(p¯q, pq¯, pq¯)
(p¯q, p¯q¯, p¯q¯)
(p¯q, pq¯, p¯q¯)
(p¯q, pq¯, pq¯) d∗ = pq¯
4
(pq, pq, pq¯)
(pq, pq, p¯q¯)
(pq, pq, pq¯) d∗ = pq¯
5
(p¯q, p¯q, pq¯)
(p¯q, p¯q, p¯q¯)
(p¯q, p¯q, pq¯) d∗ = pq¯
6
(pq, pq¯, pq¯)
(pq, pq¯, p¯q¯)
(pq, pq¯, pq¯) d∗ = pq¯
Table 1 does not give an exhaustive list of possible type profiles, but only groups of
those which share the voting profile under informative voting. Note that the given
parametrization satisfies the Non-degeneracy and No efficiency ties assumptions. For
instance, pq is the efficient decision for t = (p¯q, pq, pq), and p¯q is the efficient decision
for t = (p¯q, p¯q, p¯q).
How often does joint efficiency 2 hold? Can we conclude that it always holds for a
reasonable domain of combinations of model parameters? The answer is no, as small
deviations from the above parameters lead to the failure of the condition. For instance,
keeping all else the same, let aq = 0.53 instead of 0.52. Joint efficiency 2 no longer
holds. This is because in Group 5 above, the efficient decision for t = (p¯q, p¯q, p¯q¯)
is now p¯q while the efficient decision for t = (p¯q, p¯q, pq¯) is pq¯. So, these two type
profiles lead to the same voting profile under informative voting but they do not share a
common efficient decision. Similar violations can be obtained by letting, for instance,
ap = 0.56 or aq¯ = 0.61.
Remark 1 Under simple preferences, joint efficiency 2 holds for some combinations
of parameters n, ar for r ∈ {p, p¯, q, q¯}, pis for s ∈ J .
Regardless of whether the condition holds or not, one can still reason about most
likely states given a voting profile. Consider a combination of model parameters and
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assume informative voting of some class (2 or 3) for which σinf (p¯q¯) = pq¯ without loss
of generality. Let t be any type profile and v = σinf (t). For each r ∈ {p, q}, I denote
by ntr the number of types in t containing proposition r. Similarly, I define n
v
r for
each r ∈ {p, q} as the number of votes in v containing r. Given that p¯q¯ types in the
type profile – whenever they exist – are replaced by pq¯ in the voting profile, we must
have nvp ≥ ntp and nvq = ntq. I denote by tˆ the type profile that is equivalent to v, so,
tˆ = v. What determines the efficient decision given a type profile is the number of
occurrences of each proposition in the profile. An efficient decision for a type profile
with k number of evidence for p and l number of evidence for q is given by F (k, l).
We then have the following:
• If F (nvp , nvq ) = pq, then F (ntp, ntq) ∈ {pq, p¯q};
• If F (nvp , nvq ) = pq¯, then F (ntp, ntq) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q};
• If F (nvp , nvq ) = p¯q, then F (ntp, ntq) = p¯q.
Under a conveniently defined voting rule10, informative voting leads to the efficient
decision with certainty in one case out of the three possible cases and rules out a
certainly inefficient decision in two cases out of the three. An analogous analysis can
be written for the case where σinf (p¯q¯) = p¯q. For the case where σinf (p¯q¯) = pq (which
is only possible for informative strategy of class 3), the analysis changes slightly, since
now neither the number of p types nor the number of q types can be learned from
the voting profile. Yet, one can still derive similar conditions and focus on a class of
voting rules which, at the least, rules out one inefficient decision for each case.
The example and the discussion that follows, shows the fragility of joint efficiency 2,
hence, the fragility of efficient information aggregation. The reasoning behind is the
impossibility of revealing all available information. Before I propose ways to over-
come this problem, I focus on the implications of joint efficiency on consequentialist
preferences in the next section.
3.4 Consequentialist preferences
What are the implications of joint efficiency (1 and 2) under consequentialist prefer-
ences? To start with, I ask the question whether the impossibility obtained for simple
preferences with joint efficiency 1 persists under consequentialist preferences. I state
the answer to this question after defining the following two coefficients.
A = pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n
+ pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n−1 ap¯
1− ap ,
B = pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n−1 aq¯
1− aq + pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n
.
10This rule should naturally satisfy the following: For a voting profile v ∈ J , f(v) = p¯q if
F (nvp , n
v
q ) = p¯q; f(v) ∈ {pq, p¯q} if F (nvp , nvq ) = pq; f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q} if F (nvp , nvq ) = pq¯.
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Theorem 4 Under consequentialist preferences, there exists a voting rule for which
informative voting of class 1 is efficient if and only if the decision pq is efficient
only for the unanimous type profile t = (pq, ..., pq) (which is the case if and only if
A,B > pipq).
The theorem states that informative voting of class 1 can be efficient under consequen-
tialist preferences if pq is the efficient decision only when there is perfect evidence
for pq. This is what joint efficiency 1 reduces to under consequentialist preferences.
To satisfy this condition, the prior probability of pq should be sufficiently low. For
instance, if pipq = pip¯q = 0.3, pipq¯ = 0.4, ap = aq = ap¯ = aq¯ = 0.6 and n = 3, such a
voting rule exists whereas no voting rule makes informative voting efficient if instead
pipq = 0.35, pip¯q = 0.25 and pipq¯ = 0.4.
The judgment sets pq¯ and p¯q both lead to the same consequence according to (2), so
the same utility by (3). Consider a type profile t with ti = pq¯ for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}
and a type profile t′ with t′i = p¯q for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Joint efficiency 1, the existence
condition for efficient information aggregation, would require that there is a common
efficient decision for both t and t′. This is of course not possible under simple prefer-
ences (by Non-degeneracy), while it follows under consequentialist preferences. Hence,
the possibility in Theorem 4 relies on the fact that voters are indifferent between the
two judgment sets pq¯ and p¯q given the assumption that Co(pq) 6= Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q)
and that preferences are defined by (3).
I now present a simple characterization of voting rules which make informative voting
efficient under consequentialist preferences when the condition is satisfied.
Proposition 1 Assume consequentialist preferences and joint efficiency 1. A voting
rule f : J n → J makes informative voting of class 1 efficient if and only if for every
voting profile v ∈ J n, f(v) = pq if v = (pq, ..., pq) and f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q} otherwise.
Proposition 1 describes a class of voting rules which accept pq only when there is
unanimous agreement about both issues being true. Some of these rules characterized
by Proposition 1 satisfy some natural properties (and others do not). In Appendix
A.1, I introduce some desirable properties of a voting rule to characterize a sub-
class of voting rules given in Proposition 1. The part shows that one can still attain
desirable properties of a voting rule without compromising on efficient information
aggregation.
What about informative voting of class 2 and class 3? How likely is it that joint
efficiency 2 holds? The indifference of voters between the two judgment sets pq¯ and
p¯q under consequentialist preferences naturally allows to obtain a larger domain of
parameters where the condition holds compared to under simple preferences. Let me
illustrate this with an example similar to Example 1 above.
Example 2 Consider the following combination of parameters: n = 3, ap = 0.55,
aq = 0.52, ap¯ = 0.55, aq¯ = 0.6, pipq = 0.33, pipq¯ = 0.47 and pip¯q = 0.2. (These
parameters differ from those of Example 1 only by the slight modifications in prior
probabilities. This modification was necessary to satisfy the Non-degeneracy assump-
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tion.) Under informative voting of type 2, σinf (p¯q¯) = pq¯ while under informative
voting of type 3, a sincere voter would be indifferent between pq¯ and p¯q given the
assumption Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q). Let me assume that in that case, an informative voter
votes for the judgment set with a higher prior probability; in this case, for pq¯. This
parametrization gives the same table as Table 1, but now, p¯q should be added to the
last column as the other efficient decision. So, joint efficiency 2 is satisfied. Unlike
under simple preferences, keeping all else fixed and increasing aq or ap, joint efficiency
2 continues to hold.
The impossibility results of this section are mainly driven by the fact that some
voters receive information that cannot be revealed fully due to the incompatibility
with the possible states. I remove this incompatibility by assuming jointly distributed
private information for each issue in Section 5 (at the cost of some symmetry assump-
tions) and find that efficient information aggregation is always possible. Nonetheless,
conflicting information is expected in the case of multiple interconnected issues, es-
pecially when types are distributed separately for issues than jointly. In next section,
I propose abstention as a way to escape from impossibility of efficient information
aggregation even when conflicting information is present.
4 Abstention
A voter with a conflicting type knows that she is ‘ill-informed’ about the true state.
As voters share a common goal, she may prefer to abstain in the hope that better
informed voters will determine the decision. In the context of Feddersen and Pesen-
dorfer (1996) where a fraction of voters has state-dependent common preferences, a
less informed voter prefers to abstain even when there is no cost to voting. Here,
if conflicting types abstain while other types vote informatively, the problem of cor-
rectly revealing information is solved. Then, all is left to show is that such strategy
profile is an equilibrium. As long as the resulting strategy profile is efficient, it is an
equilibrium by the previously mentioned result of McLennan (1998). So, my aim is,
once again, to design voting rules which make such strategy profile efficient.
I use the same notation and model as before with the exception of the definition of a
voting strategy. Let Jφ = {pq, pq¯, p¯q, φ} be the set of possible votes where φ indicates
abstention. For this section, I define a (voting) strategy as a function σ : T → Jφ.
As before, I write σ = (σ1, ...., σn) for a profile of voters’ strategies. In this section,
a voting rule f : J nφ → J maps each voting profile v = (v1, ..., vn) to a decision
d = f(v).
The informative strategy with abstention is the voting strategy σ with σ(t) = t for all
t ∈ T \ {p¯q¯} and σ(p¯q¯) = φ.
Theorem 5 Consider an arbitrary common utility function u : J × J → R that is
truth-tracking. There always exists a voting rule which makes informative voting with
abstention efficient (hence, an equilibrium).
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This theorem simply states that one can always find a mechanism which lead to
efficient decisions when every voter votes according to the informative strategy with
abstention. If a (virtual) social planner implements this rule, no voter with the
inconsistent type has an incentive to vote and no other voter has an incentive to
abstain instead. To understand the properties of the rule making informative voting
with abstention efficient, one needs to focus on the exact kind of preferences. Among
the various voting rules that are studied in the literature, quota rules are particularly
common. Formally, a quota rule is given by two thresholds mp,mq ∈ {0, 1, ..., n+ 1},
and for each voting profile it accepts p [q] if and only if at least mp [mq] voters accept
it in the profile. However, as p¯q¯ cannot be chosen, not every combination of thresholds
would lead to a well-defined voting rule.11 I focus on a class of voting rules, called
quota rules with exception, which behave as a quota rule when at least one of the issues
is accepted by a number of people equal to or more than the acceptance threshold.
When neither issue reaches the acceptance threshold, as p¯q¯ is not an admissible state,
the rule diverges from a quota rule and returns a decision according to an exception
rule. The structure of the exception rule may depend on the specific utility function
in use.
I analyze simple and consequentialist preferences in turn.
4.1 Simple Preferences
In the next result, I show that the quota rule with exception with particular thresholds
and an exception rule is the only rule one can use to make informative voting with
abstention efficient. To state the result, I start by introducing some notation. Let
βr(k) =
(
1−ar¯
ar
)k (
ar¯
1−ar
)n−k
for each r ∈ {p, q} and k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. I consider a
quota rule with exception f with thresholds mp,mq and with the exception rule
given as
nvr < mr for both r ∈ {p, q} and
pipq¯
pip¯q
> [<]
βp(n
v
p )
βq(nvq )
⇒ f(v) = pq¯ [p¯q]. (4)
I define two coefficients:12
kp = min
{
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} : pipq
pip¯q
> βp(k)
}
, (5)
kq = min
{
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} : pipq
pipq¯
> βq(k)
}
. (6)
11For a quota rule to be well-defined in this framework, one must have mp + mq ≤ n + 1. The
additional requirement of mp + mq ≤ n + 1 is for leaving out p¯q¯ from possible outcomes. This
requirement follows from Theorem 2(c) in Dietrich and List (2007b). Limiting attention to these
rules would not necessarily lead to efficiency. As the focus here is on efficient information aggregation
instead of procedural requirements, one has to depart from quota rules.
12The minimum defining kp or kq is taken over a nonempty set since emptiness is impossible under
simple preferences. This follows from the Non-degeneracy assumption on the model parameters.
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These coefficients have an interpretation: as can be proved, for p [q] to be more
probably true than false given all information and all else equal, at least kp [kq]
individuals need to receive evidence for p [q], i.e., need to have a type containing p
[q]. Note that for each r ∈ {p, q}, βr(k) is a decreasing function of k. So, βr will
decrease when the number of types supporting r increases, and the inequality will be
more likely to hold; or in other words, r will be more likely to be true than false.
I am now ready to state the result.
Theorem 6 Assume simple preferences. Informative voting with abstention is effi-
cient if and only if the voting rule is the quota rule with exception with thresholds kp,
kq and the exception rule given by (4).
This result shows that the quota rule with exception with thresholds kp and kq and
the exception rule (4) is the only rule one may use in view of making informative
voting with abstention efficient.
4.2 Consequentialist Preferences
I now turn to consequentialist preferences when abstention is a possibility. I first
propose a simple characterization result for voting rules which make informative vot-
ing with abstention efficient. As expected, the class of voting rules in this result is
different than the rule characterized in Theorem 6.
For k, l ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}, I define the coefficient
γ(k, l) =
pipqa
k
p(1− ap)n−kalq(1− aq)n−l∑
s∈J pisaksp(1− asp)n−kalsq(1− asq)n−l
(7)
where sr ∈ {r, r¯} is the value of proposition r ∈ {p, q} in state s. The coefficient γ(k, l)
has a natural interpretation. It is the probability that the state is pq conditional on
having k times evidence for (and n−k times evidence against) p and l times evidence
for (and n − l times evidence against) q. So, γ(k, l) = Pr(pq|t) for some (hence,
any) type profile t ∈ T n containing p exactly k times and q exactly l times. As
Co(pq) 6= Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q), given a type profile t, E(u(d, S)|t) = Pr(pq¯|t) + Pr(p¯q|t)
for d ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}. Hence, given a type profile t containing p exactly k times and q
exactly l times, the only efficient decision is pq if γ(k, l) > 1/2. Otherwise, the two
other decisions are both efficient. This implies the following simple characterization
result.
Proposition 2 Assume consequentialist preferences. A voting rule f makes inform-
ative voting with abstention efficient if and only if for every voting profile v ∈ J nφ the
decision f(v) is pq if γ(nvp , n
v
q ) > 1/2 and in {pq¯, p¯q} otherwise.
I do not provide a formal proof for this proposition as the claim can easily be shown by
elaborating the argument above. For a given type profile t, whenever γ(ntp, n
t
q) > 1/2,
E(u(pq, S)|t) is maximal, hence, pq is the efficient decision. When every voter follows
informative strategy with abstention, in the resulting voting profile v, one must have
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nvr = n
t
r for each r ∈ {p, q}. As long as the rule selects pq only when γ(nvp , nvq ) > 1/2,
the efficiency is guaranteed.
What about quota rules with exception? Can one use this natural class of voting rules
to guarantee efficient information aggregation? Unlike when preferences are simple,
for some combinations of the model parameters, no quota rule with exception makes
informative voting with abstention efficient. I characterize those combinations for
which this class of rules is a possibility. I begin by introducing two coefficients.
lp = min{k ∈ {0, ..., n} : γ(k, n) > 1/2} (8)
lq = min{k ∈ {0, ..., n} : γ(n, k) > 1/2}. (9)
The coefficient lp (lq) has a simple interpretation. Given that all voters hold q (p)
type, it is the number of voters with evidence for p (q) it minimally takes for the
decision pq to be the efficient decision. By Non-degeneracy, pq must be efficient for at
least one type profile; so, these two minima are taken over non-empty sets of values
of k.
Theorem 7 Assume consequentialist preferences. There exists a quota rule with
exception making informative voting with abstention efficient if and only if γ(lp, lq) >
1/2. In this case, this quota rule with exception has the thresholds lp and lq and an
exception rule satisfying
nvr < lr for each r ∈ {p, q} =⇒ f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}. (10)
As Theorem 7 shows, aiming for a quota rule with exception is not feasible for some
combinations of values of the model parameters. For instance, let n = 3, pipq = 0.5,
pipq¯ = 0.2, pip¯q = 0.3, ap = ap¯ = 0.62, aq = aq¯ = 0.6. For this combination, lp = 2 and
lq = 1, however, γ(2, 1) < 1/2. On the other hand, if I let ap¯ = 0.6 keeping all else
the same, γ(2, 1) > 1/2 and the quota rule with exception with thresholds lp = 2 and
lq = 1 makes informative voting efficient.
While Proposition 2 states a simple characterization of the type of voting rules mak-
ing informative voting with abstention efficient, it is generally possible to say more.
Among the voting rules described by Proposition 2, I illustrate two of them. The first
one takes the form
f(v) =
{
pq if γ(nvp , n
v
q ) > 1/2
p¯q if γ(nvp , n
v
q ) ≤ 1/2 (11)
for all v ∈ J nφ . I can analogously define a voting rule where the resulting decision is
pq¯ instead of p¯q when γ(nvp , n
v
q ) ≤ 1/2. Following Proposition 2, (11) clearly renders
informative voting with abstention efficient. Next, I define another interesting rule
which satisfies some desirable properties and always makes informative voting with
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abstention efficient under some restrictions. Let
f(v) =

pq if γ(nvp , n
v
q ) > 1/2, or
if nvp ≥ mp and nvq ≥ mq
pq¯ if γ(nvp , n
v
q ) ≤ 1/2, nvp ≥ mp and nvq < mq, or
if γ(nvp , n
v
q ) ≤ 1/2, nvp < mp, nvq < mq and nvp > nvq
p¯q if γ(nvp , n
v
q ) ≤ 1/2, nvp < mp and nvq ≥ mq, or
if γ(nvp , n
v
q ) ≤ 1/2, nvp < mp, nvq < mq and nvp ≤ nvq
(12)
for all v ∈ J nφ and some thresholds mp,mq ∈ {0, ..., n}. Let l′p = min{k ∈ {0, ..., n} :
γ(k, lq) > 1/2} and l′q = min{k ∈ {0, ..., n} : γ(lp, k) > 1/2}. It is easy to see that
if thresholds mp,mq in (12) are chosen such that mp = l
′
p and mq = l
′
q, informative
voting with abstention is efficient with (12). This rule is special in the sense that
whenever γ(lp, lq) > 1/2, we necessarily have mp = lp = l
′
p and mq = lq = l
′
q; so, it is
contained by the set of the quota rules with exception described in Theorem 7. Note
that under this choice of thresholds, γ(mp,mq) > 1/2 by the definitions of l
′
p and l
′
q
and by γ being an increasing function in both arguments.
The voting rule (11) is illustrated in Figure 1a). The voting rule (12) is illustrated in
Figure 1b)&c) for different choice of thresholds. In Figure 1b), thresholds mp,mq are
chosen such that mq > mp and γ(mp,mq) < 1/2. In Figure 1c), thresholds mp,mq
are chosen such that mp = l
′
p and mq = l
′
q which imply γ(mp,mq) > 1/2. While the
rules described in Figure 1a) and Figure 1c) make informative voting efficient, the
one described in Figure 1b) does not.
nvp
nvq
pq
n
n
γ =
1/2
a)
pq¯ (or p¯q)
n
n
nvp
mp
mq
45◦
γ =
1/2
p¯q
pq
pq¯
nvq
b)
n
n
nvp
lp mp = l
′
p
mq = l
′
q
lq
45◦
γ =
1/2
p¯q
pq
pq¯
nvq
c)
Figure 1: Illustration of the decision as a function of the number of votes for p (nvp )
and q (nvq ). Part a) illustrates (11) (or its analogue), Part b) illustrates (12) for
mp,mq such that mq > mp and γ(mp,mq) < 1/2, and Part c) illustrates (12) for
mp = l
′
p and mq = l
′
q. In Part a) the white area shows the voting profiles which lead
to pq and the shaded area shows the voting profiles which lead to pq¯ (or p¯q). In Part
b) and in Part c), the light gray (dark gray) [white] area illustrates the voting profiles
which lead to pq¯ (p¯q) [pq] under (12).
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5 The case of jointly distributed private information
I now consider a setting where I introduce new assumptions on the distribution of
types, while the judgment aggregation problem, preferences and prior probabilities
are defined as in Section 2. A voter’s type takes the form of an element of J ,
generically denoted by t as before. Following the previous notation for simplicity,
I write t = (t1, . . . , tn) for a profile of voters’ types. Nature draws a state-types
combination (s, t) ∈ J n+1 according to a probability measure denoted Pr. I assume
that the parts of the type for p and q are distributed jointly given the state, and the
probability of getting evidence for s given that s is true is denoted by a = Pr(t = s|s)
for every s ∈ J , belongs to (1/2, 1), and does not depend on the voter i. The lower
bound of 1/2 reflects the (standard) idea that information is more reliable than a
fair coin. Consequently, Pr(t 6= s|s) = 1 − a < 1/2. In this setting, the conflicting
type p¯q¯ can no longer be observed by voters. To obtain a tractable model and derive
interpretable properties, I assume symmetry concerning the likelihood of receiving
correct information. So, the probability of receiving correct information is the same
across states. Each voter submits a vote in J based on her type. A (voting) strategy
is a function σ : J → J , mapping each type t ∈ J to the type’s vote v = σ(t). As
before, I write σ = (σ1, ...., σn) for a profile of voters’ strategies. A strategy σ of a
voter is informative if σ(t) = t for all types t. Just as in the benchmark model, one
defines the notions of an efficient decision given a type profile, an efficient strategy
profile, and an equilibrium strategy profile.
Theorem 8 Consider an arbitrary common utility function u : J × J → R that
is truth-tracking. There always exists a voting rule which makes informative voting
efficient.
I first focus on simple preferences. In what follows below, the term a1−a (> 1) plays
an important role, which is the likelihood ratio of correct information to incorrect
information given any state. It turns out that there is a uniquely defined voting rule
that should be imposed to guarantee efficient information aggregation under simple
preferences. Before I define this rule and state the theorem, let me introduce two
functions which will be useful in what follows for a given n. For each k, l ∈ {0, 1, ..., n},
let α(k, l) = ( a1−a)
2n−2k−l, and β(k, l) = ( a1−a)
k−l. For any voting profile v ∈ J ,
let
f(v) =

pq if
pipq
pip¯q
> α(nvp , n
v
q ) and
pipq
pipq¯
> α(nvq , n
v
p )
p¯q if
pipq
pip¯q
< α(nvp , n
v
q ) and
pip¯q
pipq¯
> β(nvp , n
v
q )
pq¯ otherwise.
(13)
Theorem 9 Assume simple preferences. Informative voting is efficient if and only
if the voting rule is given by (13).
Unlike in the setting where signals for each proposition are distributed independently
and abstention is possible, a quota rule with exception does not lead to efficient
information aggregation in this setting. The reasoning is simple. Private information
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containing, say, p does not necessarily carry evidence for both pq and pq¯ as before,
but all depends on whether the type also contains q or q¯. Hence, the effect of p
evidence is no longer balanced out when one compares the likelihood of pq and pq¯.
What about consequentialist preferences? I start by a simple characterization, and
then move on to the more specific case of quota rules with exception. The message
of the proposition is straightforward, so I do not provide a formal proof.
Proposition 3 Assume consequentialist preferences. A voting rule f makes inform-
ative voting efficient if and only if for every voting profile v ∈ J n the decision f(v)
is pq if pipq > pip¯qα(n
v
p , n
v
q ) + pipq¯α(n
v
q , n
v
p ) and in {pq¯, p¯q} otherwise.
I define two coefficients to state the next result:
hp = min {k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} : pipq > pip¯qα(k, n) + pipq¯α(n, k)} , (14)
hq = min {k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n} : pipq > pip¯qα(n, k) + pipq¯α(k, n)} . (15)
One can show that hp [hq] has a simple interpretation. Given that all voters hold q
(p) type, it is the number of voters with evidence for p (q) it minimally takes for the
decision pq to be the efficient decision. The next theorem characterizes the necessary
and sufficient conditions for a quota rule with exception to be the voting rule making
informative voting efficient.
Theorem 10 Assume consequentialist preferences. There exists a quota rule with
exception making informative voting efficient if and only if pipq > pip¯qα(hp, hq) +
pipq¯α(hq, hp). In this case, this rule has uniquely defined thresholds hp and hq and an
exception rule satisfying
nvr < mr for both r ∈ {p, q} =⇒ f(v) ∈ {p¯q, pq¯}. (16)
6 Conclusion
I consider a model where a group of voters with common interests and private inform-
ation wants to form collective judgments over two propositions which are mutually
interconnected. I study the problem of full efficient information aggregation in a
Bayesian voting game setting.
I study different settings. To start with, I assume that the evidence for each issue is
distributed independently, which may lead to conflicting information. More precisely,
one may obtain type p¯q¯ while this is not a possible state. In the case of multiple in-
terconnected issues, it is sensible that conflicting information occurs, especially when
voters collect information from different resources or form opinions based on inde-
pendently collected evidence. This leaves room for flexibility in extending the notion
of informative strategy. I consider several natural definitions and show that, in almost
all cases, there is no voting rule making informative voting efficient. I also consider a
setting where instead signals for each proposition that constitute types are distributed
jointly, and, information conflicts no longer occur within voters. Under this assump-
tion, there is always a voting rule making informative voting efficient. As the negative
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message mentioned above is led by the impossibility of revealing the inconsistent type,
this paper contributes to two other fields: (i) the field of mechanism design that fo-
cuses on communication constraints (e.g. Blumrosen and Feldman 2013, Van Zandt
2007), (ii) the field of information aggregation focusing on the consequences of mis-
match of type and state spaces (e.g., Schmitz and Tro¨ger 2012, Barelli, Bhattacharya
and Siga 2018, Bozbay and Peters 2018). The analysis of the benchmark case is rel-
evant and of particular interest, and I propose abstention as a way to escape from the
impossibility. I show that when abstention is a possible strategy, efficient information
aggregation can be achieved even when there are information conflicts.
An interesting extension of this paper’s analysis might be allowing for pre-voting
deliberation together with some degree of diversity in preferences. (See Austen-Smith
and Feddersen, 2006, for a model of deliberation in a similar setting.) I consider two
issues, which is the simplest case for multi-issue problems. I study exhaustively all
possible interconnections between two issues (except bi-implication which is a trivial
case). Such agendas are important in practice as examples show. The negative
conclusion of Theorem 1 can be extended to an arbitrary number of interconnected
issues but extending the complete analysis to many-issue case is not trivial. The
number of possible types of interconnections and correspondingly, the number of
ways to obtain a group action both grow rapidly with the number of issues, and it is
not clear how to obtain general positive results.
A Appendix
A.1 Properties of a voting rule: an illustration
As the primary goal of this paper is designing a mechanism, I now introduce some
desirable properties of a voting rule to characterize a sub-class of voting rules given in
Proposition 1. This section does not aim to provide a throughout axiomatic analysis
of all voting rules mentioned in the main text, but to illustrate in the setting of
Section 3.4 which desirable properties of voting rules can be attained when issues
are interconnected while information is aggregated efficiently. I define anonymity,
monotonicity and neutrality as follows:
• Anonymity: For all voting profiles (v1, ..., vn) ∈ J n and all permutations (i1, ...,
in) of the voters, f(vi1 , ..., vin) = f(v1, ..., vn).
• Monotonicity: For all voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n, if for each r in f(v) the voters
who accept r in v also accept r in v′, then f(v′) = f(v). This property implies
that increasing the support for the accepted proposition does not reverse the
acceptance.
• Neutrality: For all voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n for which there is no permutation
(i1, ..., in) of the voters with (vi1 , ..., vin) = (v
′
1, ..., v
′
n), if for every voter i the
vote vi contains p if and only if the vote v
′
i contains q, then f(v) contains p if and
only if f(v′) contains q. Informally, the two issues are treated symmetrically.
23
While some of the voting rules described in Proposition 1 are anonymous, monotonic
and neutral, others fail to satisfy any of these properties. Once I impose these axioms,
I restrict the large class of rules to those satisfying the following four conditions as I
state in the next proposition. For each v ∈ J n,
f(v) = pq ⇐⇒ nvp = nvq = n (17)
f(v) = pq¯ if nvp > n
v
q (18)
f(v) = p¯q if nvp < n
v
q (19)
f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q} if nvp = nvq < n. (20)
Proposition 4 Assume consequentialist preferences and that informative voting is
efficient with some voting rule. A voting rule f : J n → J is anonymous, monotonic,
neutral and makes informative voting efficient if and only if it belongs to the class of
rules defined by (17)-(20).
Proof. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J . Let nvr denote the number of occurrences
of r ∈ {p, q} in a voting profile v.
A. First, let f be defined by (17)-(20). Clearly, f is anonymous. It follows from
Proposition 1 that informative voting is efficient with f since for all v ∈ J n, f(v) = pq
if and only if nvp = n
v
q = n; so, if and only if v = (pq, ..., pq). To show monotonicity
of f , take two voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n such that for all r ∈ f(v), the voters who
vote for r in v also vote for r in v′.
Case 1: f(v) = pq. Then v = (pq, ..., pq). By definition, v′ = v and f(v′) = pq.
Case 2: f(v) = pq¯. The definition of f implies either nvp > n
v
q or n
v
p = n
v
q < n;
and the definition of v′ implies nv′p ≥ nvp and nv
′
q ≤ nvq . Suppose nvp > nvq . Then,
nv
′
p > n
v′
q and f(v
′) = pq¯. Next, suppose nvp = nvq < n. If v′ 6= v, one has nv
′
p > n
v
p
or nv
′
q < n
v
q which means n
v′
p > n
v′
q and f(v
′) = pq¯.
Case 3: f(v) = p¯q. One can show that f(v′) = p¯q analogously to Case 2.
It remains to show neutrality of f . Take two voting profiles v,v′ ∈ J n such that
vr = v
′
r′ for every distinct r, r
′ ∈ {p, q} and there is no permutation of voters
(i1, ..., in) with (vi1 , ..., vin) = (v
′
1, ..., v
′
n). I have to show that (*) f accepts r in v if
and only if f accepts r′ in v′. I distinguish 3 cases:
Case 1: f(v) = pq. It is clear that v′ = v, and f(v′) = pq.
Case 2: f(v) = pq¯. By definition of f , either nvp > n
v
q or n
v
p = n
v
q < n. One can
see that the latter is not possible since then one could find a permutation of voters
(i1, ..., in) with (vi1 , ..., vin) = (v
′
1, ..., v
′
n). Suppose n
v
p > n
v
q . By definition of v
′,
whenever p (q) is accepted in v, q (p) is accepted in v′. This means nv′p < nv
′
q and
f(v′) = p¯q. So, f accepts p in v and q in v′, and it accepts q¯ in v and p¯ in v′. Hence,
(*) holds.
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Case 3: f(v) = p¯q. One can show that f(v′) = p¯q analogously to Case 2.
B. Conversely, let f be anonymous, monotonic and neutral, and make informative
voting efficient. I have to show that (∗) f is defined by (17)-(20). By Proposition
1 and informative voting being efficient, f(v) = pq if and only if v = (pq, ..., pq),
equivalently nvp = n
v
q = n. Now, take a voting profile v ∈ J n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}.
Case 1: nvp > n
v
q . Suppose for a contradiction, f(v) = p¯q. Let v
′ be a voting profile
with nv
′
p = n
v
q and n
v′
q = n
v
p . I start by proving the following claim.
Claim: For each combination of k, l ∈ {0, ..., n}, there is only one voting profile
v ∈ J n with nvp = k and nvp = l up to the permutations of votes.
The claim follows from the fact that all votes containing p¯ are p¯q, and similarly, all
votes containing q¯ are pq¯. Hence, subtracting number of p (q) occurrences in a profile
from n gives the exact number of p¯q (pq¯) votes. Then, there is only one voting profile
with nvp times q and n
v
q times p up to permutations of votes. Hence, by neutrality and
anonymity, f(v′) = pq¯. However, by monotonicity of f , f(v′) = p¯q since nv′p ≤ nvp
and nv
′
q ≥ nvq , a contradiction. Then, f(v) = pq¯.
Case 2: nvp < n
v
q . One can show that f(v) = p¯q analogously to Case 1.
Case 3: nvp = n
v
q < n. By Proposition 1 and informative voting being efficient,
f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}.
So, (∗) is true. 
Among the efficient aggregation possibilities, anonymity, monotonicity and neutrality
can be attained. Note that the property of independence, which imposes that the
decision on each proposition r ∈ {p, q} only depends on the votes on r, is not satisfied
by any rule defined in Proposition 4. This rules out quota rules which are very
common in the literature and which, given the optimal acceptance thresholds, almost
always lead to efficient information aggregation when issues are independent or when
there is a single issue. Quota rules are monotonic, anonymous and independent, but
not necessarily neutral. Whenever the acceptance thresholds for propositions are
equal, they turn out to be neutral.
A.2 Proofs
I introduce some preliminary derivations before I prove the main results. For the case
where types for each proposition are distributed independently (as in Sections 3 and
4), the probability of the three states in J conditional on the full information t ∈J n
is given as follows, where k is the number of types that contain p in t and l is the
number of types that contain q in t.
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Pr(pq|t) = pipqa
k
p(1− ap)n−kalq(1− aq)n−l
Pr(t)
(21)
Pr(pq¯|t) = pipq¯a
k
p(1− ap)n−k(1− aq¯)lan−lq¯
Pr(t)
(22)
Pr(p¯q|t) = pip¯q(1− ap¯)
kan−kp¯ alq(1− aq)n−l
Pr(t)
. (23)
The following derivations are for the setting in Section 5, where types for every
proposition are distributed jointly. Let nts denote the number of occurrences of s ∈ J
in a type profile t. The notation nvs is defined similarly for each s ∈ J and a voting
profile v. Accordingly, the probability of the three states in J conditional on the full
information t ∈ J n is given as follows, where k = ntpq and l = ntp¯q (and consequently,
ntpq¯ = n− k − l).
Pr(pq|t) = pipqa
k(1− a)n−k
Pr(t)
(24)
Pr(p¯q|t) = pip¯qa
l(1− a)n−l
Pr(t)
(25)
Pr(pq¯|t) = pipq¯a
n−k−l(1− a)k+l
Pr(t)
. (26)
Proof of Theorem 1. To start with, I introduce some notation. Given a voting
profile v, let Θ(v) denote the set of all type profiles which possibly lead to v under
informative voting. Let σ be an informative strategy for each voter. For informative
voting to be efficient, for each v there must be a common efficient decision d∗ for
all t ∈ Θ(v). This is a very strong requirement since any state in a voting profile
v might come from an equivalent type or p¯q¯. Specifically, consider the type profile
t0 = (p¯q¯, . . . , p¯q¯). When voters vote informatively, this type profile might lead to any
v ∈ J n. So, one could only reach efficient outcomes if the same decision(s) is efficient
for all type profiles, which is a degenerate case that is ruled out. 
Proof of Theorem 2. To start with, I introduce some notation. Given a voting
profile v, let Θ(v) denote the set of all type profiles which possibly lead to v under
informative voting of a given class. Given a type profile t, let Ω(t) denote the set of
all voting profiles which possibly result from t under informative voting of a given
class. Hence we obtain Θ(v) (Ω(t)) from v (t) for a given class of informative voting.
Consider a voting rule f : J n → J .
(i) For this part of the proof, assume informative voting of class 1. Whenever I refer
to informative voting, this is the class I am referring to. First, let joint efficiency 1
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hold. Suppose there is an exogenously given ordering of judgment sets, and let f be
the following voting rule: for all v ∈ J n, f(v) = d⇔ d is the highest ordered decision
among all decisions which are efficient for some t ∈ Θ(v). Consider any type profile
tˆ ∈ T n and suppose informative voting. I want to show that (∗) for each v ∈ Ω(ˆt),
f(v) is efficient for tˆ. Let v ∈ Ω(ˆt). One can show that all type profiles in Θ(v)
share the same subvector restricted to pq. (This is because under informative voting
all voters with type pq – and only voters with type pq – vote for pq, hence all type
profiles possibly leading to v must have the same set of voters with type pq.) Since
joint efficiency 1 holds, there is some decision d which is efficient for all t ∈ Θ(v),
including tˆ. By No efficiency ties, if any other decision d′ 6= d is efficient for some
t ∈ Θ(v), it must have the same utility as d, which implies that it is efficient for all
t ∈ Θ(v). Then, (∗) holds.
Conversely, let f make informative voting efficient. Let t, t′ be two type profiles in
T n with {i : ti = pq} = {i : t′i = pq}. One has to show that (∗∗) there is d ∈ J which
is efficient for both t, t′. By construction, for each v ∈ Ω(t), t′ ∈ Θ(v); and similarly,
for each v′ ∈ Ω(t′), t ∈ Θ(v′). Then, f(v) must be efficient for t′ (as well as t) and
f(v′) must be efficient for t (as well as t′) since informative voting is efficient. So,
(∗∗) holds.
(ii) Assume informative voting of class 2 (3). Let joint efficiency 2 hold. Let Dt ⊆ J
denote the set of efficient decisions given a type profile t. Consider any type profile
t ∈ T n and let v = σinf (t). Take the type profile t′ with t′ = v. This implies
t′ does not have any type p¯q¯ in it as a voting profile is free from conflicting types.
By construction, we have σinf (t) = σinf (t′). As joint efficiency 2 holds, there must
be a decision d that is efficient for both t, t′. (If t = t′, this is straightforward.)
By No efficiency ties, if any other decision d′ 6= d is efficient for (without loss of
generality) t′, it must necessarily have the same utility as d and be efficient for t as
well. This implies Dt = Dt′ for all t, t
′ ∈ Θ(v). Suppose there is an exogenously
given ordering of judgment sets, and let f be the following voting rule: for all v ∈ J n,
f(v) = d ⇐⇒ d is the highest ordered decision among all decisions in Dt ⊆ J for
t = v. This rule clearly renders informative voting of class 2 (3) efficient.
It is straightforward to show the converse implication. Let f make informative voting
of class 2 (3) efficient. Let t, t′ ∈ T n be two type profiles with σinf (t) = σinf (t′) = v.
Since f makes informative voting efficient, d = f(v) must be efficient for both t, t′.

Proof of Theorem 3. Assume simple preferences. By Theorem 2, it is sufficient
to show that (*) joint efficiency 1 never holds.
Suppose for a contradiction, joint efficiency 1 holds. Consider the two type profiles
t = (pq¯, ..., pq¯) and t′ = (p¯q, ..., p¯q). Since {i : ti = pq} = {i : t′i = pq} = ∅ and joint
efficiency 1 holds, there is a decision which is efficient for both profiles. The judgment
set pq¯ must be efficient for t since pq¯ must be efficient for some type profile by Non-
degeneracy assumption and t is the type profile that provides the strongest evidence
possible in favor of pq¯. So, if pq¯ was not efficient for t, it would not be efficient for any
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type profile which contradicts to Non-degeneracy assumption. Similarly, p¯q must be
efficient for t′. Hence, pq¯ and p¯q are both efficient given t or t′, which contradicts to
No efficiency ties assumption under simple preferences. Hence, we have (*). 
Proof of Theorem 4. Let the condition that pq is efficient only for the unanimous
type profile t = (pq, ..., pq) be denoted by (*). I generally write informative voting
for informative voting of class 1 throughout the proof.
A. I first prove that (*) implies that there is a voting rule for which informative voting
is efficient and A,B > pipq. Assume (*) holds. This means for every type profile
different than the unanimous type profile (pq, ..., pq), both pq¯ and p¯q are efficient.
(Note that under consequentialist preferences, a voter is indifferent between pq¯ and
p¯q.) Then, joint efficiency 1 holds because for every pair of type profiles which share
the same set of voters with type pq, the requirement of joint efficiency 1 that there is
a common efficient decision is satisfied. By Theorem 2, there is a voting rule which
makes informative voting efficient. Let t, t′ be type profiles with one pq¯ and one p¯q
respectively while each of the rest of the types is pq. Without loss of generality, let
t = (pq, ..., p¯q) and t′ = (pq, ..., pq¯). Using (21), 22) and (23) and that pq¯ is efficient,
I can write the following:
E(u(pq¯, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t) (27)
⇔pipq¯an−1p (1− ap)(1− aq¯)n + pip¯q(1− ap¯)n−1ap¯anq > pipqan−1p (1− ap)anq (28)
⇔pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n
+ pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n−1( ap¯
1− ap
)
> pipq. (29)
Similarly,
E(u(pq¯, S)|t′) > E(u(pq, S)|t′) (30)
⇔pipq¯anp (1− aq¯)n−1aq¯ + pip¯q(1− ap¯)nan−1q (1− aq) > pipqanpan−1q (1− aq) (31)
⇔pipq¯
(
1− aq¯
aq
)n−1( aq¯
1− aq
)
+ pip¯q
(
1− ap¯
ap
)n
> pipq. (32)
So, A,B > pipq.
B. I now prove that if there is a voting rule for which informative voting is efficient,
(*) holds. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J and suppose f makes informative
voting efficient. By Theorem 2, joint efficiency 1 holds. Given a type profile t ∈ T n,
let Γ(t) denote the set of type profiles which have the same subvector on pq as in t.
Now, take a type profile tˆ ∈ T n with k times pq where 1 ≤ k < n. The proof proceeds
in several steps.
Claim 1: There is a type profile t ∈ Γ(tˆ) with ntp = k and ntq = k.
Any type profile with k times pq and n−k times p¯q¯ satisfies this condition and one of
these type profiles is obviously in Γ(tˆ). Now, take t˜ ∈ T n with k − 1 times pq.
28
Claim 2: There is a type profile t ∈ Γ(t˜) with ntp = k and ntq = k.
One can easily see there is always a type profile with the exact same pq structure as
t˜ and with only one occurrence of pq¯ and only one occurrence of p¯q.
Claim 3: Under consequentialist preferences, for all t, t′ ∈ T n with ntp = nt
′
p and
ntq = n
t′
q , E(u(d, S)|t) = E(u(d, S)|t′) for each d ∈ J .
The claim follows from the expressions (21)-(22). By joint efficiency 1, there is a
decision d ∈ J which is efficient for all t ∈ Γ(tˆ). Similarly, there is a decision
d ∈ J which is efficient for all t ∈ Γ(t˜). Combining Claim 1, 2 and 3, one obtains
that the same decision d ∈ J is efficient for all t ∈ Γ(tˆ) and all t ∈ Γ(t˜). Since
this is true for all k with 1 ≤ k < n, there is a decision d which is efficient for all
t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}. By Non-degeneracy, pq is efficient for t = (pq, ..., pq). Hence,
d must be in {pq¯, p¯q} since otherwise pq would be efficient for all type profiles which
contradicts Non-degeneracy. Hence, (*) holds.
C. I finally prove that A,B > pipq implies (*). Let A,B > pipq. I first prove the
following claim.
Claim 4: The expected utility of pq given a type profile t is an increasing function of
ntp and n
t
q.
The claim follows from the definition of the utility function and from Pr(S = pq|t)
being an increasing function of ntp and n
t
q in (21). Let t, t
′ ∈ T n be type profiles with
one pq¯ and one p¯q respectively while each of the rest of the types is pq. Without loss
of generality, let t = (pq, ..., p¯q) and t′ = (pq, ..., pq¯).
By (27)-(32), one has E(u(pq¯, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t) and E(u(pq¯, S)|t′) > E(u(pq, S)|t′).
By Claim 4, it follows that E(u(pq¯, S)|t) = E(u(p¯q, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t) for all
t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)} which means pq¯, p¯q are efficient for each t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}.
Thus, (*) holds. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J . To show the ‘if’
part, let the rule f be defined as f(v) = pq if v = (pq, ..., pq) and f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}
for every other v ∈ J n. To prove that informative voting is efficient with f , I have
to show that pq is efficient only for the type profile t where every type is pq, i.e., for
t = (pq, . . . , pq), since this is the only type profile which gives σinf (t) = (pq, . . . , pq)
under informative voting of class 1. For all other type profiles, pq¯ and p¯q must both
be efficient which follows from Non-degeneracy and Joint efficiency 1 (and also given
that pq¯ is efficient for t ⇐⇒ p¯q is efficient for t by (3)).
To show converse, let f make informative voting efficient. Note that Theorem 4 im-
plies that decision pq is only efficient for the unanimous type profile t = (pq, ..., pq)
under consequentialist preferences. Then, for all voting profiles obtained by inform-
ative voting from any t ∈ T n \ {(pq, ..., pq)}, f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}. By Non-degeneracy, pq
is efficient for t = (pq, ..., pq). By f making informative voting efficient, f(v) = pq if
v = (pq, ..., pq). 
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Proof of Theorem 5. Since by (21)-(23) the conditional distribution of the state
given full information t ∈ T n depends on t only via the numbers ntp and ntq, so does the
conditional expected utility of each decision, and hence, the set of efficient decisions.
Recall that, for each (k, l) ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}2, F (k, l) ∈ J is a decision that is efficient
for some (hence, every) t ∈ T n for which ntp = k and ntq = l. Under informative
voting with abstention, those who abstain have type p¯q¯. This means that for any
given type profile t, ntp = n
v
p and n
t
q = n
v
q if voters vote according to the informative
strategy with abstention. The voting rule f defined by v 7→ f(v) = F (nvp , nvq ) renders
informative voting efficient. 
Proof of Theorem 6. Consider a rule f : J nφ → J .
A. First, assume f is the quota rule with exception with thresholds kp and kq and
the exception rule (4). Consider a given type profile t ∈ T n. Supposing that voters
hold informative strategy with abstention, the resulting voting profile has nvr = n
t
r
for each r ∈ {p, q} given that voters who abstain have type p¯q¯. I have to show that
the decision d = f(v) is efficient for t, i.e., that (*) E(u(d, S)|t) > E(u(d′, S)|t)
for all d′ ∈ J \{d}. (I use ‘>’ rather than ‘≥’ in (*) because of No efficiency ties
assumption.)
Case 1: Let d = pq. By definition of f , I have nvp ≥ kp and nvq ≥ kq. Equi-
valently, ntp ≥ kp and ntq ≥ kq. These imply pipqpip¯q >
(
1−ap¯
ap
)ntp ( ap¯
1−ap
)n−ntp
and
pipq
pipq¯
>
(
1−aq¯
aq
)ntq ( aq¯
1−aq
)n−ntq
by (5) and by (6) respectively and by βr being a decreas-
ing function of ntr for each proposition r. By (21)-(22), we have Pr(pq|t) > Pr(p¯q|t)
and Pr(pq|t) > Pr(pq¯|t) which imply (*).
Case 2: Let d = p¯q. By definition of f , this may mean one of the following:
(i) nvp < kp and n
v
q ≥ kq, or;
(ii) nvp < kp, n
v
q < kq, and
pipq¯
pip¯q
<
βp(nvp )
βq(nvq )
.
Suppose (i). We must then have
pipq
pip¯q
<
(
1−ap¯
ap
)ntp ( ap¯
1−ap
)n−ntp
and
pipq
pipq¯
>
(
1−aq¯
aq
)ntq ( aq¯
1−aq
)n−ntq
by (5) and by (6) respectively (and by βr(n
t
r) being a decreasing function of n
t
r for
each proposition r). These further imply Pr(p¯q|t) > Pr(pq|t) > Pr(pq¯|t), where the
former inequality follows from (21) and (23) and the latter inequality follows from
(21) and (22). Hence, we have (*). Suppose (ii). We can rewrite
pipq¯
pip¯q
<
βp(nvp )
βq(nvq )
as
pipq¯
pip¯q
<
(
1−ap¯
ap
)ntp ( ap¯
1−ap
)n−ntp ( aq
1−aq¯
)ntq (1−aq
aq¯
)n−ntq
. By (22) and (23), this implies
Pr(p¯q|t) > Pr(pq¯|t). Note that as ntp < kp, ntq < kq, by definition of kp, kq, the
efficient decision cannot be pq as discussed above. Hence, I have (*).
The case of d = pq¯ is analogous to the case of d = p¯q. Hence, I have the desired result
(*) for each d ∈ J .
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B. Conversely, suppose informative voting with abstention is efficient under f . I
consider any t ∈ T n and the corresponding voting profile v ∈ J nφ assuming in-
formative voting with abstention. Suppose f(v) = pq. By efficiency of pq, one
must have E(u(pq, S)|t) > E(u(d′, S)|t) for all d′ 6= pq, which is equivalent to
Pr(pq|t) > Pr(d′|t) for all d′ 6= pq under simple preferences. For d′ = p¯q, I can
write
pipq
pip¯q
>
(
1−ap¯
ap
)ntp ( ap¯
1−ap
)n−ntp
by (21) and (23). Similarly, by (21) and (22),
pipq
pipq¯
>
(
1−aq¯
aq
)ntq ( aq¯
1−aq
)n−ntq
for d′ = pq¯. As nvr = ntr for each r ∈ {p, q}, the former
implies nvp ≥ kp and the latter implies nvq ≥ kq by the definitions of kp, kq and βp, βq
being decreasing functions of nvp , n
v
q respectively.
Now, let f(v) = p¯q. I have to show that (i) or (ii) holds. From Pr(p¯q|t) > Pr(pq|t),
I can write the following using (21) and (23):
pipq
pip¯q
<
(
1−ap¯
ap
)ntp ( ap¯
1−ap
)n−ntp
, which
implies ntp = n
v
p < kp as kp is the minimum value satisfying the reverse inequality
and the RHS is decreasing in ntp. By (22) and (23), Pr(p¯q|t) > Pr(pq¯|t) if and only if
pipq¯
pip¯q
<
(
1−ap¯
ap
)ntp ( ap¯
1−ap
)n−ntp ( aq
1−aq¯
)ntq (1−aq
aq¯
)n−ntq
. Since nvr = n
t
r for each r ∈ {p, q}
under informative voting with abstention, I can rewrite this expression for nvr as (**)
pipq¯
pip¯q
<
(
1−ap¯
ap
)nvp ( ap¯
1−ap
)n−nvp ( aq
1−aq¯
)nvq (1−aq
aq¯
)n−nvq
. The RHS of (**) is equivalent to
βp(nvp )
βq(nvq )
. So, if f(v) = p¯q, one always has (**)
pipq¯
pip¯q
<
βp(nvp )
βq(nvq )
. I have already shown that
nvp < kp. If, moreover, n
v
q < kq, I have (ii). I will show that (**) necessarily holds
when nvp < kp and n
v
q ≥ kq. Let nvq ≥ kq. Then, pipqpipq¯ > βq(nvq ) by (6). Rearranging,
I have
pipq¯
pipq
< 1/βq(n
v
q ). Multiplying by
pipq
pip¯q
< βp(n
v
p ), one obtains (**). So, if for a
voting profile v, nvp < kp and n
v
q ≥ kq, f(v) must be p¯q as it makes informative voting
efficent. One can easily check that there is no case other than (i) and (ii) where p¯q is
the efficient decision for t = v. So, if f(v) = p¯q, one must have (i) or (ii).
The case of f(v) = pq¯ is analogous. 
Proof of Theorem 7. A. First, suppose f : J nφ → J is a quota rule with exception
with thresholdsmp andmq and some exception rule, and suppose further that it makes
informative voting efficient. I have to show that
(*) mp = lp and mq = lq,
(**) nvr < lr for each r ∈ {p, q} =⇒ f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}, and
(***) γ(lp, lq) > 1/2.
Consider a type profile t ∈T n. Assuming informative voting with abstention, the
resulting voting profile v has the same number of p and q occurrences as t, thus,
nvp = n
t
p and n
v
q = n
t
q (as those who abstain have type p¯q¯).
To show (*), suppose ntp = n and n
t
q = lq. By (9), γ(n, lq) > 1/2. So f(v) = pq by
Proposition 2. Thus, lq ≥ mq as f is a quota rule with exception. Similarly, it can be
shown that lp ≥ mp. I now have to show the converse inequalities. Consider a voting
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profile v ∈ J nφ for which nvp = mp and nvq = n which is greater than or equal to
mq. The resulting decision is f(v) = pq by definition of f . Since f makes informative
voting with abstention efficient, γ(nvp , n
v
q ) = γ(mp, n) > 1/2 by Proposition 2. Hence,
mp ≥ lp by definition of lp. Analogously, one shows that mq ≥ lq. So, I have the
desired result (*).
To show (**), suppose nvr < lr for each r ∈ {p, q} (note that if lr = 0 for any r, we
can omit this stage as the premise of (**) is never satisfied.) Recall that nvr = n
t
r
for each r ∈ {p, q} under informative voting with abstention, By definition of lp and
lq, I must have γ(n
t
p, n
t
q) < 1/2 since γ is increasing in both arguments and n
t
r < lr
for each r. So, pq¯ and p¯q are efficient, and as f makes informative voting efficient,
f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}.
Finally, I need to show (***). For any voting profile v ∈ J nφ for which nvp = lp (= mp)
and nvq = lq (= mq), I have f(v) = pq by definition of f , so that by Proposition 2,
γ(nvp , n
v
q ) > 1/2, i.e., γ(lp, lq) > 1/2.
B. Conversely, let γ(lp, lq) > 1/2. I now show that the quota rule with exception
f with thresholds lp and lq and the exception rule (10) makes informative voting
efficient. I start by proving that for all k, l ∈ {0, ..., n},
γ(k, l) > 1/2⇔ [k ≥ lp and l ≥ lq]. (33)
If k ≥ lp and l ≥ lq, then γ(k, l) ≥ γ(lp, lq) > 1/2, where the first inequality holds
because γ is increasing in each argument. If k < lp, then γ(k, l) ≤ γ(k, n) ≤ 1/2,
where the last inequality holds by definition of lp (> k). Analogously, if l ≤ lq, then
γ(k, l) ≤ 1/2.
Now consider any type profile t ∈ T n. Assuming informative voting with abstention,
the resulting voting profile v has the same number of p and q occurrences as t, thus,
nvp = n
t
p and n
v
q = n
t
q. I must show that f(v) is efficient for t. First, if n
t
p ≥ lp
and ntq ≥ lq, the decision is f(v) = pq, which is efficient by Proposition 2 since
γ(ntp, n
t
q) > 1/2 by (33). Second, if n
t
p < lp or n
t
q < lq, the resulting decision f(v) is
in {p¯q, pq¯}, which is efficient by Proposition 2 since γ(ntp, ntq) ≤ 1/2 by (33). 
Proof of Theorem 8. By (24)-(26) the conditional distribution of the state given
full information t ∈ J n depends on t only via the numbers ntpq and ntp¯q, so does the
conditional expected utility of each decision, and hence, the set of efficient decisions.
Take any type profile t ∈ J n. Assume informative voting, so, the resulting voting
profile is v = t. Suppose one can only observe nvp and n
v
q . As only those voting for
p¯q vote p¯, we must have nvp¯q = n− nvp . Similarly, nvpq¯ = n− nvq which gives us nvpq =
nvp+n
v
q −n. For each (k, l) ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}2, let F˜ (k, l) ∈ J be a decision that is efficient
for some (hence, every) t ∈ J n for which ntpq = k and ntp¯q = l in the setting of jointly
distributed types. The voting rule f defined by v 7→ f(v) = F (nvp + nvq − n, n− nvp )
renders informative voting efficient. 
Proof of Theorem 9. Consider a voting rule f : J n → J .
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A. First, assume that f is the rule given by (13). Take any type profile t ∈ J n and
suppose informative voting. Then, the resulting voting profile is v = t. I have to show
that d = f(v) is efficient for t, hence E(u(d, S)|t) > E(u(d′, S)|t) for all d′ ∈ J \{d}.
This is equivalent to showing that (*) Pr(d|t) > Pr(d′|t) for all d′ ∈ J \ {d}.
Suppose d = pq. By definition of f , one must have
pipq
pip¯q
> α(nvp , n
v
q ) and
pipq
pipq¯
>
α(nvq , n
v
q ); or equivalently,
pipq
pip¯q
> ( a1−a)
2n−2nvp−nvq and pipqpipq¯ > (
a
1−a)
2n−2nvq−nvp . Let me
focus on the former inequality. As only those voting for p¯q vote p¯, we must have
nvp¯q = n− nvp . Similarly, nvpq¯ = n− nvq which gives us nvpq = nvp + nvq − n. Then, I can
rewrite 2n− 2nvp − nvq as n− nvp − (nvp + nvq − n), which is equal to nvp¯q − nvpq. Hence,
pipq
pip¯q
> ( a1−a)
nvp¯q−nvpq , or equivalently,
pipqa
nvpq(1− a)−nvpq > pip¯qanvp¯q(1− a)−nvp¯q . (34)
As v = t, multiplying both sides of (34) by (1− a)n, I obtain pipqantpq(1− a)n−ntpq >
pip¯qa
ntp¯q(1 − a)n−ntp¯q , which by (24) and (25), is equivalent to (*) for d′ = p¯q. The
proof for d′ = pq¯ is analogous.
Let d = p¯q. By definition of f , one must have
pipq
pip¯q
< α(nvp , n
v
q ) and
pip¯q
pipq¯
> β(nvp , n
v
q );
or equivalently,
pipq
pip¯q
< ( a1−a)
2n−2nvp−nvq and pip¯qpipq¯ > (
a
1−a)
nvp−nvq . I already know that
the former can be written as (34) with the opposite sign; so, following the above
discussion, (*) holds for d′ = pq. Similarly, I can write the latter inequality as
pip¯q
pipq¯
> ( a1−a)
nvpq¯−nvp¯q since nvp − nvq = (n − nvp¯q) − (n − nvpq¯) = nvpq¯ − nvp¯q. Rearranging
it, I obtain
pip¯qa
nvp¯q(1− a)−nvp¯q > pipq¯anvpq¯(1− a)−nvpq¯ . (35)
As v = t, multiplying both sides of (35) by (1− a)n, I obtain pip¯qantp¯q(1− a)n−ntp¯q >
pipq¯a
ntpq¯(1− a)n−ntpq¯ which by (25) and (26), is equivalent to (*) for d′ = pq¯.
The proof for d = pq¯ is analogous and follows from above arguments.
B. Conversely, assume informative voting is efficient under f . I consider any v ∈ J n
and the corresponding type profile t = v. Since informative voting is efficient, the
decision d = f(v) is efficient for t (= v), i.e., E(u(d, S)|t) > E(u(d′, S)|t) for all
d′ ∈ J \{d}. Recal from part A that nvp¯q = n − nvp , nvpq¯ = n − nvq , and nvpq =
nvp + n
v
q − n.
Let d = pq. From E(u(pq, S)|t) > E(u(p¯q, S)|t), I can write pipqantp+ntq−n(1 −
a)2n−n
t
p−ntq > pip¯qan−n
t
p(1 − a)ntp using (24) and (25). Rearranging this inequality,
I have
pipq
pip¯q
> ( a1−a)
2n−2ntp−ntq = α(ntp, ntq). Thus, d = pq =⇒ pipqpip¯q > α(nvp , nvq ).
One can analogously show that d = pq =⇒ pipqpipq¯ > α(nvq , nvq ) from E(u(pq, S)|t) >
E(u(pq¯, S)|t) using (24) and (26).
Let d = p¯q. From E(u(pq, S)|t) < E(u(p¯q, S)|t), I know that I already have pipqpip¯q <
α(ntp, n
t
q) = α(n
v
q , n
v
p ). From E(u(p¯q, S)|t) > E(u(pq¯, S)|t), I can write pip¯qan−n
t
p(1−
a)n
t
p > pipq¯a
n−ntq(1−a)ntq . Rearranging, pip¯qpipq¯ > ( a1−a)n
t
p+n
t
q . The RHS of the inequality
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is equal to β(ntp, n
t
q), which is equal to β(n
v
p , n
v
q ) as v = t. Thus, d = p¯q =⇒ pip¯qpipq¯ >
β(nvp , n
v
q ).
Finally, the case of d = pq¯ is straightforward since the converse of each of the two
efficiency conditions E(u(pq¯, S)|t) > E(u(pq, S)|t) and E(u(pq¯, S)|t) > E(u(p¯q, S)|t)
has already been shown above. 
Proof of Theorem 10. A. First, suppose f : J n → J is a quota rule with
exception with thresholds mp and mq and some exception rule, and suppose further
that it makes informative voting efficient. I have to show that
(*) mp = hp and mq = hq,
(**) nvr < hr for each r ∈ {p, q} =⇒ f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}, and
(***) pipq > pip¯qα(hp, hq) + pipq¯α(hq, hp).
Consider a type profile t ∈J n. Assuming informative voting, the resulting voting
profile v = t, thus, nvp = n
t
p and n
v
q = n
t
q.
To show (*), suppose ntp = n and n
t
q = hq. By definition of hq, pipq > pip¯qα(n, hq) +
pipq¯α(hq, n). Then, f(v) = pq by Proposition 3. So, hq ≥ mq as f is a quota rule
with exception. Similarly, it can be shown that hp ≥ mp. I now have to show the
converse inequalities. Consider a voting profile v ∈ J n for which nvp = mp and
nvq = n which is greater than or equal to mq. The resulting decision is f(v) = pq
by definition of f . Since f makes informative voting with abstention efficient, pipq >
pip¯qα(n
v
p , n
v
q ) + pipq¯α(n
v
q , n
v
p ) = pip¯qα(mp, n) + pipq¯α(n,mp) by Proposition 3. Hence,
mp ≥ hp by definition of hp. Analogously, one shows that mq ≥ hq. So, I have the
first desired result (*).
To show (**), let nvr < hr for each r ∈ {p, q} (note that if hr = 0 for any r, the
premise of (**) is never satisfied, so this part of the proof can be omitted.) Under
informative voting with abstention, v = t. By definition of hp and hq, I must have
pipq < pip¯qα(n
t
p, n
t
q) + pipq¯α(n
t
q, n
t
p) since the RHS is increasing in both arguments and
ntr < hr for each r. So, pq¯ and p¯q are efficient, and as f makes informative voting
efficient, f(v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q} by Proposition 3.
Finally, I need to show (***). For any voting profile v ∈ J n for which nvp = hp (= mp)
and nvq = hq (= mq), I have f(v) = pq by definition of f , so that by Proposition 3,
pipq > pip¯qα(n
t
p, n
t
q) + pipq¯α(n
t
q, n
t
p), i.e., pipq > pip¯qα(hp, hq) + pipq¯α(hq, hp).
B. Conversely, let pipq > pip¯qα(hp, hq) + pipq¯α(hq, hp). I now show that the quota
rule with exception f with thresholds hp and hq and the exception rule (16) makes
informative voting efficient. I start by proving that for all k, l ∈ {0, ..., n},
pipq > pip¯qα(k, l) + pipq¯α(l, k)⇔ [k ≥ hp and l ≥ hq]. (36)
If k ≥ hp and l ≥ hq, then pip¯qα(k, l) +pipq¯α(l, k) ≤ pip¯qα(hp, hq) +pipq¯α(hq, hp), where
the inequality holds because the expression is decreasing in each argument. If k < hp,
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pipq < pip¯qα(k, l) + pipq¯α(l, k) which holds by definition of hp. Analogously, if l < hq,
then pipq < pip¯qα(k, l) + pipq¯α(l, k).
Now consider any type profile t ∈ J n and assume informative voting. I must show
that f(v) is efficient for t. First, if ntp ≥ hp and ntq ≥ hq, the decision is f(v) = pq,
which is efficient by Proposition 3 since pipq > pip¯qα(n
t
p, n
t
q) + pipq¯α(n
t
q, n
t
p) by (36).
Second, if ntp < hp or n
t
q < hq, the resulting decision f(v) is in {p¯q, pq¯}, which is
efficient by Proposition 3 since pipq < pip¯qα(n
t
p, n
t
q) + pipq¯α(n
t
q, n
t
p) by (36). 
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